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Introduction
A well known and simple game from cooperative game theory is the glove game, introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1969) , where a pair of gloves produces worth which has to be distributed among the agents holding the gloves. This game has a nice economic interpretation and it is used to analyze simple markets (cf. Shapley and Shubik, 1969) .
Consider such a glove game with four right-glove holders (r 1 , ..., r 4 ) and two leftglove holders (l 1 , l 2 ) where l 1 , r 1 and l 2 , r 2 build a matching pair while the other right-glove holders stay alone. Let a pair produce a worth of 1. Distribution of worth according to the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) , the component restricted Shapley value (Aumann and Drèze, 1974) and the Owen value (Owen, 1977) are given in Table 1 . We see that the Shapley value does not distinguish wether a right-glove holder actually builds a matching pair (i.e., is productive or not). Therefore, we would like to have an allocation rule taking into account the actual matching pair, that is, the coalition structure. The component restricted Shapley value accounts for the coalition structure, but it underestimates the actual imbalancedness of the market. In case of minimal winning coalitions, it even treats imbalanced markets as balanced markets which stands into contradiction with taking into account the scarceness of the left-glove holders, or, in other words, the existence of alternatives these players would have outside their actual coalition. The Owen value both accounts for the coalitional structure and the degree of imbalancedness.
In general, computational complexity of the analyzed values is very high. Shapley and Shubik (1969) derive an efficient formula of the Shapley value for glove games. This paper provides efficient formulas of the component restricted Shapley value and the Owen value for glove games in case of efficient coalition structures, that is, minimal winning coalitions.
Framework: (TU)-Games and Allocation Rules and the Glove Game
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the (nonempty and finite) playerset and V N := {v : 2 N −→ R|v(∅) = 0} the set of all characteristic functions, that is, a function v ∈ V N describes the underlying game and assigns to any coalition K ⊆ N its worth v(K). A game with transferable utility (TU-game) is a tupel (N, v) . An allocation rule Y : V N −→ R n distributes the worth of any TU-game among the players. One of the most popular allocation rules is the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) :
where TU-game (N, v) , that is, the surplus player i creates in game v when entering coalition K. The Shapley value assigns to any player i the average marginal contribution over all orders of N .
A partition P of N is called coalition structure where P(i) ∈ P denotes the coalition that contains player i ∈ N and P N denotes the set of all coalition structures of N . A TU-game for coalition structures is a tupel (N, v, P) and an allocation rule for coalition structures is a function Y :
n , distributing worth of any TU-game for coalition structres among the players. Aumann and Drèze (1974) define the component restricted Shapley value (denoted by Aumann-Drèze value AD) for every (N, v, P) as follows:
Here, the whole game is restricted to the coalition of a player.
In contrast, Owen (1977) defines the Owen value:
where Σ(N, P) is the set of all orders σ over N that are compatible with the coalition structure If |R| = |L|, we say that the market is imbalanced (and balanced otherwise). In an imbalanced market, players from the smaller set are called strong players (due to their scarceness) and players from the larger set weak players. For notational reasons, denote by S := min(|L|, |R|) the number of strong players and by W := max(|L|, |R|) the number of weak players, respectively. which has to be done for every agent i ∈ N individually. Computational effort of k! is of order O(k 2 log(k)) (bottom-up multiplication). Hence, approximated from below, overall computational effort is at least of order
For the Shapley-value, Shapley and Shubik (1969) show:
Here we see that the Shapley value does not distinguish wether a weak player actually builds a matching pair (i.e., is productive or unproductive).
Lemma 2. Computational effort of the formula given by (2) is of polynomial order.
Proof. First of all, one only needs to compute 2 expressions and not an expression for every i ∈ N individually. The summation can be approximated from above by S − 1 times computing the expressions (|N | − S)! and S! in the nominator and again (|N | − S)! and S! in the denominator. Hence, computational effort can be approximated by
S)) (and computing the fraction in front of the sum, but this will not change the polynomial order).
For the component restricted Shapley value, the AD-value, the allocation formula for the glove game is easily calculated, just restrict the Shapley allocation to the coalition of a player: For all i ∈ N , set S i :=
min(|L ∩ P(i)|, |R ∩ P(i)|) ≥ 0 and
, either i stays alone as a singleton or is joined by the same type of gloves only), no matching pair exists in this coalition and the player obtains a payoff of zero. For S i > 0 we have
We see that only imbalancedness within the own coalition is taken into account. An interesting and economically important case is the case of minimal winning coalitions, that is, the coalition structure consists of matching pairs and singletons only. Consider P = such that P = {l j , r k } ∨ |P | = 1 ∀ P ∈ P, then we have
We see that in this case, the AD-value splits the worth equally among the matchingpair-players, that is, as if we had a balanced market.
Remark 1. Computational effort of the original AD-value as well as the modified version for glove games and minimal winning coalitions is negligible. However, imbalancedness of the market is underestimated/ignored.

The (efficient) Owen value for Glove Games
Consider the case of minimal winning coalitions again. Definition 1. We call a coalition structure P efficient, if only minimal winning coalitions are build and no strong player stays alone: ∀ P ∈ P : P ⊆ {l i , r j } and if for some l i ∈ L we have {l i } ∈ P, then r j ∈ R such that {r j } ∈ P and if for some r j ∈ R we have {r j } ∈ P, then l i ∈ L such that {l i } ∈ P.
Theorem 1. For all efficient coalition structures P, the Owen value for the glove game is given by
Here we see that both the coalition structure (matching vs. no matching) 
and the level of imbalancedness (S and W ) is taken into account.
Proof. Due to the form of an efficient coalition structure, we have for all P ∈ P: |P | ≤ 2 and Σ(N, P) only contains orders where pairs (l, r) are next to each other (lr or rl) . Hence, to analyze Σ(N, P), we only have to consider orders of the components of P, having in mind that each matching-pair-component has two possibilities. Therefore, |Σ(N, P)| is the number of possibilities to order the components of P times 2 # of matching pairs (each pair has two possibilities to be ordered). Due to the form of efficient coalition structures, the number of components of P is equal to W and the number of matching pairs is equal to S. Hence, we have
Since |P | ≤ 2, we have MC vgg i (σ) ≤ 1 ∀ i ∈ N. Consider P ∈ P such that P = {i}. If there is any matching candidate before i in order σ, the pair-partner of this candidate will be before i, too. Therefore, we have MC For any weak player i who forms a matching pair we note: matching pairs before i in order σ do not affect MC vgg i (σ) since the worth created by this pair is created independently of using K i (σ) or K i (σ)\{i}. As all strong players (= matching candidates) before i in order σ appear with their matching partner, we have MC vgg i (σ) = 0 whenever i is before his matching partner in order σ. If i's matching partner is before i in order σ and there is a singleton weak player before i's matching pair, we also have MC vgg i (σ) = 0, because in K i (σ)\{i}, i's matching partner already creates worth with this singleton weak player. Hence,
